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Introduction
Following the work of King (1983a) , a number of studies have evaluated the social welfare impact ofprice and income changes using equivalent incomes that are computed at some reference price vector, and a social aggregator function with these equivalent incomes as arguments in place of a social welfare function (e.g. Baccouche and Laisney (1990) , Colombino and Del Boca (1989) , King (1983a King ( , 1983b , Nichele (1990) , Patrizi and Rossi (1989) . However, typically, the impact of the choice of the reference price vector on the results of such exercises has not been clearly delineated. King (1983a) devotes limited attention to the characterization of situations (in tenns of individual or household preferences and a social welfare function) admitting Reference Price Independent Welfare Prescriptions (RPIWP), referring loosely to the work of Muellbauer (1974) and Roberts (1980) . Roberts studies the robustness of welfare changes using incomes only, and gives partial characterizations ofthe situations admitting Price-Independent Wefare Prescriptions (PIWP). Slivinski (1983) gives a complete characterization of PIWP if households face individualized prices.
In Section 3, we show that RPIWP implies PIWP on all price domains. In Section 4 we provide a complete characterization ofRPIwP ifthere are household-specific prices, and in Section 5 there is a partial characterization of RPIWP when households face common prices.
Notation
We consider H households with preferences over n goods. The preferences are described by an expenditure function whose image is eh (u h , Ph) where U h is the utility level and Ph is the vector of prices faced by household h.
1
From the expenditure function we can derive the indirect utility function, v h , of household h .
where Yh is the nominal income of household h.
(2.1)
1 We assume that e h is a continuous and increasing function of its arguments and that it is linearly homogeneous and concave in prices. In Section 3 we permit prices to be household-specific whereas in section 4 we require aU households to face the same price vector. This can also be written in terms of the equivalent income functions {~h} by using (2.1) and (2.2) to obtain
substituting (2.5) into W yields U(~,q):= W({Vh(~h,qh)})
U is an attractive form' of the social welfare function because monetary measures of social welfare changes due to a tax reform can be defined. Following page 198 in King(l983) the social gain SG from a tax reform at reference prices SG can be defined implicitly by (2.7)
2 When households face different prices we allow the reference prices to be household-specific as well. In Section 4 where we require households to face a common price vector we require the reference price vector to be common as well. The equivalent income is also known as the indirect money-metric. See Weymark (1983) or Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) .
As a practical problem it can be difficult to find a tractable functional form for U given a social welfare function W and a set of preferences {v h } and one may be tempted to construct a functional form directly on the e~uivalent incomes themselves, ignoring the primitives from which it must be derived.
3 Ethical Consistency and Reference-Price-Independent Welfare Prescriptions
We noted above that the practical difficulties involved in deriving a tractable U might lead researchers to specify a functional form directly on the equivalent incomes. This is the path followed by King (1983, p. 196) 
From Corollary 3.2.1 in Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978) this is equivalent to the following functional representation.
Proposition 3.1 G and {v h } admit RPIWP if and only if (y, p) is separable from q in F, that is,
where F is increasing in its first argument.
An immediate consequence of (3.1) and (3.2) is (y,p) , (y',p'), and q F(y,p,q)~F(y',p,q) H F(y,p',q)~F(y\p',q), (3.9) 6 See Roberts (1980) or Blackorby and Donaldson (1985 where F is increasing in its first argument.
LPIWP guarantees price independence for a given reference price while GPIWP requires consistency of these welfare prescriptions across different reference prices.
The relationships between the several definitions of price-independent welfare prescriptions which hold on both ofthe price domains considered are given in the following two propositions. 
F(E(ya,pa),q)~F(E(yb,pb),q).
Setting pa =pb =q and using (2.2) yields h =eh(vh(Yh,Ph),Ph) =Yh'
and hence we obtain (3.13) (3.14)
G(yO)~G(/') H E(yO,p)~E(yb,p).
Setting V = E yields an indirect social welfare function which satisfies PIWP.
On the other hand, if Wand {v h } admit PIWP, then from (3.8) we have
Therefore,
Setting G = V yields RPIWP.
• In this section we prove that if all households face different prices, then all three notions of price-independent welfare prescriptions are equivalent .and require that the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function and the equivalent-income aggregator must be Cobb-Douglas and that individual preferences must be homothetic (but not necessarily identical).
To do this we first use a result of Slivinski (1983) who proves that PIWP on household-specific price domains yields a Cobb-Douglas representation of the Bergson-Samuelson social·welfare function and individual homotheticity. Therefore, the equivalent-income aggregator must be Cobb-Douglas as well for RPIWP to hold. Second, we show directly that LPIWP implies that the equivalent-income aggregator must be Cobb-Douglas and that individual preferences must be homothetic which implies RPIWP. Theorem 3.2 implies therefore GPIWP. For simplicity we break this argument into a series of Lemmata and assemble th~main result at the end. We freo quently use the symbol "=" to mean "ordinally equivalent to" in what follows. =G({eh(vh(Yh,Ph) ,qh)}).
(4.9) 7 (4.12)
Conditional on the vector ofreference prices q, (Yh' Ph) is separable from its complement in (y,p) on the right side of (4.9) and hence must be so on the left. As the vector Y is separable from its complement in (Y, p) conditional on q on the left side it must also ' be so on the right. We have here two overlapping separable sets conditional on q ' . neitherofwhich is a subset ofthe other, and can invoke Gon;nan's overlapping theorem.~, Let Y-h and P-h be the income and price vectors purged 'of those components indexed -' " by h. Then Gorman's overlapping theorem implies that
F(D(y,q),p,q) = A\ah(Yh,q)+b\Ph,q) +C\Y-h,q),P-h,q). (4.10)
As we can do this for all h this yields, using Lemma 2 in Gorman(1968) or Theorem 4.8 in Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978) ,
F(D(y,q),p,q) =A(tah(Yh,q)+ t b\Ph,q),q). (4.11)
From (4.11) we have that Ph is separable from Yh in F and hence from (4.9) that Ph -is separable from Yh in v h . From Lemma 3.4 in Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978) this implies that the preferences of household hare homotheticr for all h and the equivalent income of household h can be written as in (4.7). Substituting this into G yields
Substituting this into (4.9) and using (4.11) demonstrates that each Ph and each qh are separable from their respective complements in F and hence in A. Setting Uh(Ph) = t h and et '(qh) = Sh allows us to write (4.13) where S = (St, ""SH)' Setting Sh = t h = 1. for all h demonstates that W is additively separable in its arguments and hence we can rewrite (4.13) as
A (p'(J.,S)+f I?(I.,S),S) = qf G'(Y;:'))' (4.14)
Next, setting Yh =1 and t h =1 we see that the left side of (4.14) must be additive in S as well and hence can be rewritten, in an abuse of notation, as 
This however is a Pexider equation whose solution is (4. i); to see this, use sequentially Theorem 3.5.5 in Eichhorn (1978) . This establishes the Lemma.
• Thus RPIWP and LPIWP are equivalent in this situation, and using Proposition 3.2 we obtain Theorem 4.1: On household-specific price domains, RPlWP, LPIWP, and GPIWP are equivalent and yield (4.1) 
and (4.2).
This completes our characterization on househoId-specific price domains. As a practical matter, we note that the empirical results of King (1983 a and b), Colombino and Del Boca (1989) , and Nichele (1990) are based on individualized prices. In addition they assume a family of equivalent-income aggregator functions parameterised by an index of inequality E. Theorem 4.1 asserts that the only acceptable value for this parameter is 1 if the prescriptions are to be free of the reference price vector, and this only if preferences are homothetic. The latter is satisfied in the studies of King and NicheIe but not in the study of Colombino and Del Boca. There, the methodology used does not warrant any safe welfare prescription.
RPIWP on Common Price Domains
The case of common price domains is more difficult. To date no one has provided a complete characterization of PIWP on common price domains; and we certainly have not succeeded in providing a complete characterization of RPIWP. We do however have several partial characterizations which are of some interest. Roberts (1980) .gives a wide range of results concerning PIWP on a common price domain which are closely related to the characterizations available for RPIWP. We stress in the sequel only those that have direct empirical relevance. Proof: Given RPIWP, we obtain from (3.2) and (3.4), after setting p =q,
where E is a Bergson-Samuelson indirect social welfare function. From Theorem 3.3 we know that RPIWP implies PIWP and hence we can write
where /!; is linearly homogeneous. Combining (5.1 ) and (5.2) yields the result. • Proposition 5.1 is the analogue of Proposition 3 in Roberts (1980) . The analogue of his Proposition 4 follows from Theorem 3.3. By setting q equal to the status quo price vector the first part of the proposition follows from the characterization of ethical consistency for functions of individual equivalent variations by Blackorby and Donaldson (1985) .
Conversely, consider quasi-homothetic preferences with identical slopes: (p) and the symmetric Kolm-Atkinson family If (y, p) is separable from q in F (see equation (3.2», in particular p is separable from q. Given differentiability as above, this means that the ratio "dG/"dpi over "dG/"dPj must be independent of q for all pairs of goods {i ,j}. But this ratio is equal to "dG /"dPi~(~hf£ [a~+ (yh _ah(p»~i(p) 
and it will only be independent of q i~e =O.
• In addition, Proposition 5.3 shows that'RPIWP is not characterized by Proposition 5.2. Proposition 5.3 is, however, of direct relevance for the study of Baccouche and Laisney (1990) . They present results for quasi-homothetic"individual preferences with identical slopes in terms of the Kolm-Atkinson family of equivalent-income aggregators: only their results for e =0 are robust to changes in the reference price. How much the other results would be affected by a drastic c4ange of the reference price remains to be studied. Bibliothek des fnstituts fur Welrwirtschaft Patrizi and Rossi (1989) specify PIGLOG individual preferences and consider values of 0.5, 1,2 and 5 of the parameter £ of the Kolm-Atkinson family of equivalent income aggregators. Proposition 6 of Roberts suggests that the only value of £ warranting RPIWP is £ = 1 and indeed this is easily checked directly.
Conclusions
Having accumulated negative evidence against the possibility of RPIWP as we have, we must stress the fact that, in the case of differentiable v h and G and with (y ',p ') in a neighbourhood of (y, p) , one can expect from definition (3.3) to find no violation of reference price independence over a reasonably large neighbourhood of a given q. This comment applies to the study ofPatrizi and Rossi, forinstance, where the VAT refonns considered do not alter prices dramatically and the distribution of income is left unchanged in most cases.
A potential extension of this work would be to focus on independence of welfare prescriptions with respect to the choice of reference characteristics, which becomes necessary if households differ but one still insists on anonymity of the equivalentincome aggregator. Given the negative results obtained here for a global definition of RPIWP one should probably focus attention on local results, at least as regards prices and incomes. This problem, as well at that of the choice of a reference price is also discussed by Willig (1981) , in the related context of social welfare dominance. Some interesting results are given by Donaldson (1990) : in particular, for a given reference househol d, the requirement of RPIWP is less stringent than here, as it places restrictions only on the preferences of the reference household and on the SWF.
